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Abusive supervision (AS) costs U.S. businesses billions of dollars per year in lost 
productivity, increased absenteeism, and health care costs. To reduce these costs and to 
enhance the probability of a successful exist, independent venture capitalists (IVCs) need to 
be aware of the issue of AS among the management team during the due-diligence process. 
This study addresses a gap in literature related to IVCs being able to detect AS during due-
diligence process of the management team. The research question was this: What tools, 
processes, and methods can IVCs use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the 
management team? Four tools, processes, and methods were presented to help reduce the 
frequency of employee abuse and associated costs. 
Keywords: abusive supervision, due diligence, independent venture capitalists  
Introduction 
This article is based on the supposition independent venture capitalists (IVCs) appear to lack 
awareness, requisite tools, processes, and methods to identify and understand abusive supervision 
(AS) occurring in the management team during the due-diligence process. IVCs appear to lack 
knowledge of the disruptive nature and detrimental effects of AS on competitive advantage of a 
preportfolio firm (K. J. Harris, Harvey, Harris, & Cast, 2013; J. Liu, Kwan, Wu, & Wu 2010; D. Liu, 
Liao, & Loi, 2012; Tepper, Duffy, Henle, & Lambert, 2006). A preportfolio firm is an organization 
being considered by the IVC for investing but the IVC has not come to terms with company 
management (Jackson, Bates, & Bradford, 2012). The cost of AS to U.S. companies is estimated to be 
over $24 billion per year stemming from productivity losses, increased absenteeism, and increased 
health care costs (J. Liu et al., 2010; D. Liu et al., 2012; Martinko, Harvey, Brees, & Mackey, 2013; 
Tepper et al., 2006). 
AS affects an estimated 13.6% of U.S. workers (Palanski, Avey, & Jiraporn, 2014). By conducting due 
diligence on the management team related to AS, IVCs might be able to increase profitability, reduce 
costs, restore trust, and decrease suspicion of management among employees (Tran, Tian & Sankoh, 
2013). To reduce these costs and to enhance the probability of a successful exist, IVCs need to be 
cognizant of the issue of AS among the management team during the due-diligence process. A 
successful exit occurs when the IVC realizes a return on investment by selling an interest in the 
portfolio company via an initial public offering (IPO), acquisition, merger, or sale (Strömsten & 
Waluszewski, 2012; Zhang, Aksu, & Wang, 2012). For the remainder of this article, I provide a 
statement of the problem and purpose of the research, significance of the research, the research 
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Statement of the Problem and Purpose 
The problem to be addressed is that IVCs lack tools, processes, and methods to detect AS during the 
due-diligence process of the management team leading to a successful exit, which occurs when an 
IVC sells an interest in the portfolio company via an IPO, acquisition, merger, or sale. IVCs appear not 
to be aware that AS is estimated to cost U.S. companies over $24 billion per year (J. Liu et al., 2010; 
D. Liu et al., 2012; Martinko et al,, 2013; Tepper et al., 2006). IVCs appear not to understand the 
disruptive nature and detrimental effects of AS on competitive advantage of a preportfolio firm (J. 
Liu et al., 2010; D. Liu et al., 2012; Tepper et al., 2006). To reduce costs, lower the instances of AS, 
and to enhance the probability of a successful exit, IVCs must be aware of AS among the 
management team during the due-diligence process. The purpose of this qualitative study is to 
increase awareness of AS and offer tools, processes, and methods to help detect AS during the due-
diligence process of the management team. The goal is to enhance portfolio firm competitive 
advantage and to provide IVCs with tools, processes, and methods leading to successful exits. AS 
produces negative outcomes for employees, the organization, and other stakeholders, which can 
influence IVCs consideration in investing in the preportfolio organization (MacKenzie, Garavan, & 
Carbery, 2011). It is hoped that by identifying managers who engage in AS and ameliorating the 
condition, trust can be restored, suspicion decreased, and blaming others lessened might lead to 
successful exits, which again, occur when the IVC realizes a return on investment by selling an 
interest in the portfolio company via an IPO, acquisition, merger, or sale (Strömsten & Waluszewski, 
2012; Tran et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2012).  
Significance of Research 
This research is significant for IVCs to understand AS exists, how to detect AS, and to make more 
prudent decisions whether to invest in the preportfolio firm. By understanding what AS is and 
observe instances when conducting due diligence of the management team, IVCs might become more 
aware of AS and have reduced asymmetry of information whether to invest in the firm. IVCs can use 
tools, processes, and methods offered in this research during the due-diligence process of the 
management team to enhance profitability, reduce productivity losses, lower absenteeism rates, and 
decrease health care costs leading to successful exits.  
Research Question 
The primary question driving this research was this: What tools, processes, and methods can IVCs 
use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the management team leading to successful 
exits? 
Methodological Approach 
This study is a qualitative review of the extant literature responding to the research question. The 
method used to review literature is systematic review. Researchers use systematic review in 
addressing a specific research question derived from the extant literature (Okoli, 2015; Rajaeian, 
Cater-Steel, & Lane, 2017). In a systematic review, researchers seek to search for, appraise, and 
synthesize research evidence focused on and exhaustive and comprehensive search primarily of peer 
reviewed articles (Glock, Grosse, & Ries, 2017). In a systematic review, the researcher aims to 
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for further research, and recommendation for practice (Glock & Grosse, 2015; Glock et al., 2017). 
Researchers use systematic review to provide an objective approach toward reducing bias (Bearman 
& Dawson, 2013). The review helps researchers identify and critically appraise pertinent research by 
collecting, analyzing, and reporting results from peered and non-peered-reviewed information 
(Hochrein, Glock, Bogaschewsky, & Heider, 2015). Of the 80 resources used in this article, 75 (94%) 
came from peer-reviewed published articles, and five (6%) came from from dissertations, books, and 
websites. Criteria for inclusion and exclusion of resources focused on the research question and 
available resources. Articles, books, dissertations, and authoritative websites written in English 
pertaining to independent venture capital, AS, and due diligence published between 2000 and 2017 
were included. Included studies were considered acceptable contingent upon research conducted and 
analyses provided with representative and reasonable sample size meeting reliability and validity 
criteria published with major academic outlets whenever possible (Glock & Grosse, 2015; Glock et 
al., 2017). Nonauthoritative websites, blogs, wikis, articles not written in English, and articles 
outside the focus of the research question were excluded. 
Five steps exist in systematic review. First, the researcher frames the research question(s) for review 
(Khan, Kunz, Kleijnen, & Antes, 2003, Knoll, 2017). For this study, the research question is this: 
What tools, processes, and methods can IVCs use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the 
management team leading to successful exits? Key terms used were abusive supervision, abusive 
supervision detection, due diligence, due-diligence processes, due-diligence tools, due-diligence methods, 
independent venture capitalists, management due diligence, independent venture capital decision-
making, and management assessment of independent venture capital decision-making. Key terms 
were identified by a review of the literature.  
The second step is to find relevant studies (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). For this study, academic 
resources were accessed from (a) EBSCOhost, (b) ProQuest, (c) ScienceDirect, (d) Academic Search, 
(e) ABI/INFORM, (f) Emerald, (g) Springer, (h) SAGE Journals, (i) John Wiley and Sons, and (j) 
Taylor and Francis.  
The third step is to assess the quality of the studies (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). Journals used in 
this article were assessed under the assumption the peer-review process is a reliable indicator that 
the literature review, research methods, threats to validity, and the accuracy of reporting of 
findings/results were addressed and are acceptable by a thorough examination of at least two 
independent experts in the same field. I reviewed as many peer-reviewed articles as possible to 
collect data to minimize bias. Researcher bias and confirmation bias were assessed as potential 
threats in this article. Researcher bias was mitigated by identifying inclusion criteria for primary 
studies. Criteria included data related to IVCs, due diligence, and AS. Confirmation bias was a 
threat to article retrieval and data analysis because I could have a specific belief on the effects of AS 
relative to IVC due diligence of the management team. To mitigate confirmation bias, I continually 
reevaluate impressions from data presented in the articles and challenged my preexisting 
assumptions. 
The fourth step is to summarize the evidence (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). Evidence was derived from the 
extant literature. No primary data were collected for this study. The search strategy was to use 
databases such as (a) EBSCOhost, (b) ProQuest, (c) ScienceDirect, (d) Academic Search, (e) 
ABI/INFORM, (f) Emerald, (g) Springer, (h) SAGE Journals, (i) John Wiley and Sons, and (j) Taylor 
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reviewed articles were selected when relative peered articles were unavailable. Articles and books 
that did not pertain to IVC, due diligence, AS, management assessments, elements of a successful exit, 
tools, processes, and methods to detect AS were eliminated. Information was retrieved related to AS, IVCs, 
factors informing IVC decision-making, management assessment of IVC decision-making, and management due 
diligence. 
The fifth step is to interpret findings (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). An interpretation of findings is 
offered in the results section. Data was analyzed and synthesized from the extant literature. As 
outlined in the research literature and in the rest of this article, an indication in the literature is AS 
can have a negative outcome on organizational performance, competitive advantage, and success. It 




AS is considered as the routine and sustained display of verbal and nonverbal behaviors exhibited 
publicly or privately by managers in which the employee perceives as threatening, bullying, or 
humiliating (Lui et al., 2012; Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, & Marinova, 2012; Tepper, 2000; 
Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011). Examples of verbal and nonverbal behaviors include (a) being rude, (b) 
acting in a coercive manner, (c) making derogatory comments, (d) spreading rumors, (e) withholding 
information, (f) taking undue credit for an employee’s work, (g) invading privacy, and (h) giving an 
employee the “silent treatment” (Chan & McAllister, 2014; Lui et al., 2012). The recipient of AS often 
exhibits (a) burnout, (b) anxiety, (c) work withdrawal, (d) insomnia, (e) fear, and (f) psychological 
exhaustion (Chan & McAllister, 2014; Mackey, Ellen, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2013; Tepper, 2000). 
Employees who have an abusive supervisor deal with (a) job tension, (b) public criticism, (c) loud and 
angry tantrums, (d) inconsiderate actions, (e) paranoia, and (f) distrust (Chan & McAllister, 2014; 
Mackey et al., 2013; Tepper, 2000). AS is not an issue of “one bad apple” or a one-time occurrence but 
is a routine, consistent, and complex interaction pattern between management and employees 
(Hoobler & Hu, 2013). AS often starts with managers and filters to employees (Mawritz et al., 2012). 
Employees often imitate the behaviors experienced from managers (Pearce & Manz, 2014).  
AS is a subjective assessment because one or more persons could interpret a manager’s behavior as 
abusive in one setting yet nonabusive in another context (Harvey, Harris, Gillis, & Martinko, 2014). 
An employee’s psychological and social adaptive perceptions might be instrumental in detecting 
abuse (Mackey et al., 2013). Kacmar, Whitman, and Harris (2013) suggested work environments are 
often unpredictable and might create feelings of uncertainty of employees’ future with the 
organization. Employees who experience AS often feel the organization does not recognize their 
value, become dissatisfied with the job, and intend to quit (D. Liu et al., 2012). AS diminishes an 
employee’s motivation to excel and reduces creativity resulting in productivity loses (D. Liu et al., 
2012). Employees victimized by AS often encounter decreased overall life and job satisfaction and 
have higher instances of work/family conflicts (Mackey et al., 2013).  
To cope with AS, useful strategies include (a) ingratiation, (b) communication, (c) avoidance, (d) 
talking to others, and (e) engaging in reassuring thoughts (Yagil, Ben-Zur, & Tamir, 2010). However, 
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avoidant or active coping strategies. Avoidant coping takes the form of physically and psychologically 
removing oneself from the situation, maintaining physical distance between the employee and 
manager, not coming to work, and/or increased reliance on drugs and alcohol (Tepper et al., 2006). 
Active coping is communicating AS experiences to the manager (Tepper et al., 2006). Tepper noted 
employees who are subjected to AS are more likely to use avoidant coping than active coping. 
However, active coping is deemed a more effective coping mechanism (Tepper et al., 2006).  
Extant research suggested AS is negatively associated with job satisfaction (Glambek, Matthiesen, 
Hetland, & Einarsen, 2014; Velez & Neves, 2017), organizational commitment (Glambek et al., 2014; 
Shoss, Eisenberger, Restubog, & Zagenczyk, 2013), and positively related to intentions to quit 
(Glambek et al., 2014). Tepper, Moss, Lockhart, and Carr (2007) found perceived AS experiences 
mediated the effects of AS on employees’ attitudes. Glambek et al. noted experiences of irritation and 
the fear derived from AS related to aggressive behaviors in employees. AS has been linked with 
deviant organizational behaviors such as ridicule or giving the silent treatment; actions violating 
organizational norms, and behaviors and actions that might threaten the organization and/or 
employees (Thoroughgood, Tate, Sawyer, & Jacobs, 2012). 
Mitchell and Ambrose (2007) found a positive relationship between AS and supervisor-directed 
deviance. Mitchell and Ambrose argued supervisor-directed deviance often takes the form of acting 
rudely. Supervisor-directed deviance can be construed as interpersonal deviance where the 
supervisor plays pranks or says hurtful words to employees (Martinko et al., 2013). Supervisor-
directed deviance can also be acts of fraud and or theft against the company (Ahmad & Omar, 2013). 
The relationship between AS and supervisor-directed deviance is greater among employees who 
subscribed to the concept of tit-for-tat (Mackey, Frieder, Perrewe, Gallagher, & Brymer, 2015). In 
such a scenario, abused employees often retaliate against the abusive supervisor in an aggressive 
manner and resent management other employees within the organization (Mackey et al., 2015). 
Aryee, Sun, Chen, and Debrah (2008) found AS was related to abused employees’ job performance 
and sense of self-esteem. Aryee et al. found abused employees whose self-esteem was low, AS was 
unrelated to employee deviance behavior; however, for employees with high self-esteem, AS was 
positively related to work deviance. 
Challenges exist associated with studying AS. Tepper (2000) mentioned researchers often rely on 
subjective reports to measure AS. A problem with subjective reports is some people might 
underestimate the level of AS exposure from an unwillingness to admit to have been victimized 
while others might exaggerate management behavior (Shoss et al., 2013). A related complication is 
gathering data from abused employees who are unwilling self-identified (Tepper et al., 2006).  
AS can result in high costs, create disruption, and have detrimental effects on the competitive 
advantage of a preportfolio firm. Abusive managers put organizations at a competitive disadvantage 
(Allen, Bryant, & Vardaman, 2010). Employees who must work with an abusive supervisor often 
refuse to conform to the supervisor’s instructions and are unconcerned about consequences 
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Independent Venture Capitalists 
Overview 
IVCs invest in new, high growth, high risk, and market scalable companies known as portfolio firms 
(Blum, 2015; Olsson, Frydenberg, Jakobsen, & Jessen, 2010). IVC firms are the dominant source of 
equity funding for new entrepreneurial, market scalable, high-growth, high-risk, and early-stage 
high-technology business ventures (Jackson et al., 2012; Li & Zahra, 2012; Olsson et al., 2010; 
Schertler & Tykvova, 2011). In addition to equity funding and attempting to maximize return on 
investment, IVCs provide managerial services, strategic advice, sit on boards, monitor management 
actions, hire key personnel, engage with strategic partners, and provide access to extensive networks 
of potential customers and suppliers (Bhagat, 2013; Rajan, 2010).  
The goals of the IVC are to create value for high net worth investors and to complete a successful 
exit (Jackson et al., 2012; Li & Zahra, 2012; Olsson et al., 2010; Schertler & Tykvova, 2011). IVCs 
rarely take over a portfolio firm preferring to liquidate investments at a future date via an exit 
(Bhagat, 2013). The IVC adds value during the exit process by helping to locate investment bankers 
and to present the portfolio company to public investors (Rajan, 2010). IVCs expect to generate 30% 
to 50% annual growth before agreeing to additional funding (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). The IVC 
investment carries no guarantee of a return on investment (Rajan, 2010). 
IVCs comb through thousands of business plans yearly searching and scrutinizing firms having the 
highest probability of achieving a successful exit (Bhagat, 2013). Once a firm is selected for potential 
investment, the IVC will conduct due diligence. As part of due diligence, IVCs meet with 
management teams, valuate performance metrics, discern market scalability, and determine 
whether the company’s product(s) or service(s) meet an everyday need among other factors (Blum, 
2013). The focus of this study is due diligence of the management team pertaining to AS.  
IVC firms fill a critical intermediary function by not only providing equity funding to high risk, 
market scalable, high growth portfolio firms, but creating value for high net worth investors 
(Jackson et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2010; Schertler & Tykvova, 2011). Zhang et al. (2012) found that 
IVC firms play a critical role is positively shaping new firms. Rather than taking over a firm, IVCs 
prefer to liquidate investments in portfolio companies at a future date usually through an IPO, sale, 
merger, or acquisition (Zhang et al., 2012). 
The proportion of companies that receive IVC funding is very small (Rajan, 2010). While the United 
States leads the world in IVC firms, IVC firms are not a major source of capital for small businesses 
(Rajan, 2010). Although IVC firms receive more than 1,000 requests for funding annually (Cumming, 
Schmidt, & Walz, 2010), Kaplan and Lerner (2010) indicated that only one sixth of 1% of new 
businesses obtain IVC funding. Factoring for the growth of the economy and the stock market, Rajan 
(2010) and Jackson et al. (2012) inferred that the availability of IVC funding has increased steadily 
over the years because IVC investing in early stage companies has a lower likelihood of reaching an 
exit. Jackson et al. espoused that new IVC firms have elevated financial risks compared to those of 
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Factors Influencing Independent Venture Capital Decision-Making 
The venture capital investment process involves several judgments and decision-making 
considerations made under uncertainty and asymmetry of information (Li & Zahra, 2012; Zhang, 
2011). Key factors that determine IVC investment decision-making process focus on the (a) 
entrepreneur’s personality, (b) entrepreneur’s experience, (c) the organization’s products and 
services, (d) organization’s market or industry, (f) financial considerations, (g) risks, (h) valuation, (i) 
portfolio size and scope, (j) management skills, and (k) exiting (Dhochak & Sharma, 2016). The 
entrepreneur’s personality/chemistry is the probably most significant factor of the IVCs investment 
decision (Blum, 2015). IVCs look for amicable personality, honesty and honesty above other 
characteristics such as leadership quality, a do what it takes attitude, integrity, confidence and 
commitment (Blum, 2015). IVC firms carefully review personal chemistry with the preportfolio 
management team, as the parties may be working with each other for several years (Blum, 2015). 
Looking beyond the management team, the IVC needs to evaluate the attractiveness and risks of the 
investment opportunity, considering factors as market size, strategy, technology, customer adoption, 
competitive advantage, quality, and the industry experience of the management team (Blum, 2013). 
Preportfolio firms generally do not have an established credit history, forcing the firm to seek IVC 
capital assistance (Blum, 2015). The analysis conducted by the IVC firm focuses on assessing the 
capabilities of the management team of the preportfolio firm (Gaddya, Sivaram, Jones, & Wayman, 
2017). IVCs invest billions of dollars in first-round equity financing for new ventures each year, and 
investment screening is the primary method used to decide which entrepreneur to fund (Jia & Wang, 
2017). 
The entrepreneur’s experience is another noteworthy consideration in the investment decision-
making process. An entrepreneur should have a managerial record of success, has start-up 
experience, deep product market/industry expertise, and business acumen (Dhochak & Sharma, 
2016). The products and services offered are critical to an investment decision. The product or 
service should serve an everyday need yet be innovative, scalable, patentable, and exhibits a clear 
competitive advantage (Blum, 2013). Market is a key consideration in investment decision-making 
(Dhochak & Sharma, 2016). 
IVCs typically invest in portfolio firms that exhibit long-term, little liquidity, high-risk equity with 
the promise of high return on investment (Rajan, 2010). IVCs invest at the early as well as later 
stages in the portfolio firm's life cycle (Rajan, 2010). Most IVCs view an IPO as the preferred exit 
strategy with the central goal to achieve the highest ROI to increase shareholder value and market 
valuation for the portfolio firm (Rajan, 2010). In this respect, a strategic trade-off exists between 
aiming for growth or profitability of the portfolio firm (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Mu ̈ller, 2013). 
Portfolio firms favor growth, while IVCs favor profitability (Blum, 2015). Generally, IVC-funded 
firms strive to become market leaders in fast growth markets to command a premium at the IPO 
(Dhochak & Sharma, 2016). 
Risk and returns are directly proportional to each other. IVCs investment always has an estimation 
of systematic risk or beta within its venture (Dhochak & Sharma, 2016). R. S. Harris, Jenkinson, 
and Kaplan (2014) noted a fund’s portfolio diversification model and estimated an average  of 1.12 





International Journal of Applied Management and Technology 140 
 
 
Several considerations influence the valuation of IVC investments. Valuations occur only when a 
portfolio company has refinanced a loan or anticipate an exit event (Korteweg & Sorensen, 2010). 
Bartkus and Hassan (2009) indicated that portfolio companies in California and Massachusetts had 
higher rates of capital inflows than portfolio firms did in other states. In addition, most IVC firms 
and IVC funding in the United States occurs in California or Massachusetts (Bartkus & Hassan, 
2009). 
The IVC members decide the funding level for portfolio firms based on the facts gathered during the 
screening, negotiation, and due-diligence process. In exchange for providing capital funding, the IVC 
expects the portfolio firms to generate 30% to 50% annual growth in value before agreeing to 
capitalize subsequent funding stages (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). The challenge for both parties is that 
IVCs view portfolio firm valuations as unrealistic, while the portfolio firms interpret IVCs’ 
valuations as unreasonably stringent (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). 
High volatility from valuations in public equity markets mixed with economic and competition 
uncertainties are rampant in the IVC industry (Blum, 2013). An increase in IPO valuations often 
prompts younger IVCs to raise more funds from investors (Blum, 2013). A statistically strong 
correlation exists between the rate of return of IVC funding and the overall market returns (Guo, 
Lou, & Pérez-Castrillo, 2015). 
IVCs prefer to invest in a portfolio rather than a single investment, which ultimately affects their 
investment strategies and returns. Buraschi, Porchia, and Trojani (2010) found that marginal 
returns are dependent on the optimal portfolio size, whereas Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009) concluded 
that portfolio size inversely related to the start-ups potential and riskiness (i.e., IVCs prefer larger 
portfolio when ventures have the low potential and high risk and vice versa). Dhochak and Sharma 
(2016) mentioned that an investor has the limited ability to add value in new venture, so they have 
to consider the size and scope of the portfolio accordingly. 
Anticipating a success exit is the most crucial factor of an investment decision-making, because it is 
directly proportionate to the returns. Thus, IVCs follow the number of pre-and postinvestment 
activities for successful exit. Possibly the most critical value addition that an IVC can provide to the 
portfolio firm is enabling the IPO, strategic merger, sale, or acquisition (Rajan, 2010). Large private 
equity and IVC investors have well-connected networks and possess an in-depth understanding of 
the capital markets (Rajan, 2010). Therefore, if the portfolio company wants to list as an IPO, 
acquiring the best merchant banker and the ability to value the portfolio firm correctly is vital to 
raising the expected funds (Rajan, 2010). The IVCs’ goal throughout the entire investment process is 
to focus on achieving large financial returns on investments (Rajan, 2010). Dhochak and Sharma 
(2016) argued exit strategies are equally significant at the initial screening process of a proposal.  
Management Assessment of Independent Venture Capital Decision-Making 
Venture capitalists realize that they are often betting on people when they make investment 
decisions hoping their assessments of portfolio firm personnel are accurate (Blum, 2015). The 
purpose of due diligence is to determine which business plans can eventually lead to a successful exit 
by lessening adverse selection and reducing asymmetry of information between the preportfolio 
company and the IVC (Flyvbjerg, 2013). Due diligence encompasses all activities deemed necessary 
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total hours expended by the IVC conducting research on the portfolio firm (Flyvbjerg, 2013). 
Flyvbjerg noted the time spent on due diligence is generally commensurate with the expected 
funding size.  
Each year, about 15% of business plan submissions reach the due-diligence stage (Metrick & Yasuda, 
2011; Simic, 2015). From these 15%, only 5% are considered suitable for investment and enter 
negotiation (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011; Simic, 2015). IVCs usually invest in less than 3% of business 
plans submitted (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011; Simic, 2015).  
During the due-diligence process, IVCs focus on reducing market, technology, management, and 
governmental uncertainty (Blum, 2014). Because individuals are instrumental to success or failure 
of a business, IVCs desire no uncertainty about the veracity and intentions of the management team 
to advance a sustainable organization (Blum, 2014). In addition to the management team, due-
diligence research is conducted on current and predicted market and economic conditions, technology 
adoption and challenges, regulatory environment, and competitive advantage (Lehtonen & Lahti, 
2009). Although not an all-inclusive list, as part of the due-diligence process, IVCs (a) analyze 
current and past financial statements, (b) review market comparables to determine valuation price, 
(c) conduct varying market analysis, (d) review competitive advantage and market trends, (e) 
determine whether the technology is disruptive and scalable, (f) decide whether the technology meets 
an everyday need, (g) review provisional and approved patents, (h) review any pending legal action, 
and (i) analyze local, state, and or federal regulatory issues (Blum, 2014; Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009).  
The time to complete due diligence varies from 3 to 6 months (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). IVCs who 
conduct extensive due diligence are more involved with supporting the portfolio firm realize higher 
return on investment through a successful exit (Blum, 2014; Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). Due diligence 
is not just about empirical data but also qualitative factors. 
IVCs often rely on “gut feelings,” personal chemistry, and value personal relationships with the 
management team (Blum, 2014). IVCs want absolute confidence management understands the 
technology, industry standards, and market demand before investing. Using qualitative and 
quantitative factors, IVCs determine the length of involvement with the portfolio firm. Generally, 
IVCs seek a 3- to 5-year relationship before exiting (Blum, 2014). Based on due diligence, IVCs can 
determine valuation and funding requirements to achieve a successful exit based on high return on 
investment. Funding usually starts at $10 million and can go up to $100 million or more through 
funding phases (Blum, 2014). 
During the due-diligence process, IVC firms focus on reducing investment risk. Before making a 
financial investment, the IVC firm performs extensive research on the preportfolio firm’s product 
line, management team, and internal and external competitive environments (Blum, 2014; Lehtonen 
& Lahti, 2009). Due diligence is measured by the total hours spent performing research on the 
preportfolio company (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). 
IVC firms will review pending legal action, provisional and approved patents, market potential and 
strategy, the competitive environment, and the portfolio firm’s competitive advantage (Lehtonen & 
Lahti, 2009). The time spent by IVCs doing due diligence is generally proportionate to the 
anticipated investment funding size (Blum, 2015). According to Lehtonen and Lahti (2009), the time 
from screening to early funding is approximately 6 months. Yung (2009) countered that the average 
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who perform extensive due diligence, and are more involved in the postinvestment operations of the 
portfolio firm experience, significantly higher ROI through a successful exit (Lehtonen & Lahti, 
2009). Lehtonen and Lahti stated IVCs who focused on early funding opportunities experienced few 
negative exits. 
Management Due Diligence  
Due diligence of the management team is crucial to deciding whether AS exists within the 
preportfolio firm. Management due diligence is the process of evaluating and assessing the 
effectiveness of the management team’s ability to achieve strategic objectives and manage risk 
(Dobre, 2013). A consequence of IVC mistakes during managerial due diligence can mean the 
difference between competitive advantage of the firm with a successful exit or sudden failure 
resulting in bankruptcy (Dobre, 2013).  
IVCs use management due-diligence processes to (a) ensure sustainable profit and growth for 
organizations, (b) increase the chance of good returns on investment by reducing risk, (c) understand 
strengths and weaknesses, (d) efficiently appraise the management team, and (e) assess 
management team members' abilities to reach common goals (Benoliel, 2015; Boyle, Parmeter, 
Boehlert, & Paterson, 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2013). Managerial due diligence identifies undiscovered 
threats that might affect productivity such as unacknowledged motives, AS, or personal conflicts 
between individual managers (Delak & Bajec, 2013). Management due diligence provides IVCs with 
a foundation of knowledge for assessing the management team and individual manager performance 
(Cooper, 2015). Based on due diligence, the IVC can determine whether nonconforming managers 
need training or retraining or if they need to be dismissed to achieve organizational goals (Cooper, 
2015).  
The basis of due diligence of the management team is the understanding that significant tacit 
knowledge exists with the individual manager, not necessarily in the firm’s documented processes, 
procedures, and policies (Cooper, 2015). Traditionally, the most important aspect of the evaluation of 
the portfolio company for the IVC is the experience and personality of the management team (Nunes, 
Félix, & Pires, 2011). Characteristics IVCs look for in the management team are (a) hard workers, 
(b) good delegators, (c) strategic thinkers with vision, and (d) an understanding of the organization’s 
technology and market (Nunes et al., 2011). Knowledge of AS is also important for the organization 
to remain competitive as abusive managers contribute to productivity losses, increased absenteeism, 
increased health care costs, and lost trust. Over the course of the relationship with the portfolio firm, 
IVCs continually evaluate the management team noticing significant changes in the character of the 
team and organizational performance.  
IVCs place importance on the quality of management because IVCs understand the business 
environment will change, and management must be able to effectively react to competitive internal 
and external threats, varying customer demands, new regulations, and other market and technology 
dynamics. Having an abusive supervisor can negate the quality of the management team potentially 
placing the competitive of the IVC investment at higher risk (Allen et al., 2010; Nunes et al., 2011). 
Ensuring management is making correct tactical and strategic decisions are vital for the 
organization’s success. IVCs want to ensure the management team can meet and overcome 
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or a team member is nonconforming to company and societal standards of conduct, IVCs will often 
recruit additional key talent (Blum, 2015). 
Results 
Because of high costs, disruptive nature, and detrimental effects of AS on the competitive advantage 
of a preportfolio firm, IVCs need to be aware the effect AS has on employees and management. In 
response to the research question: What tools, processes, and methods can IVCs use to detect AS 
during the due-diligence process of the management team leading to successful exits, I explored 
relevant tools, processes, and methods. My findings indicated IVCs could (a) use a 360-degree 
feedback program, (b) conduct detailed background checks on the management team, (c) assess the 
management team for AS, and (d) observe management in action. Given the significant costs abusive 
managers can have for organizations, senior management is well advised to ameliorate and when 
possible eliminate AS.  
360-Degree Feedback 
IVCs could use a 360-degree feedback program during the due-diligence process to observe whether 
the management culture fosters civility among management and employees (Tepper et al., 2006). 
The 360-degree feedback program is a system where subjects receive confidential and anonymous 
feedback from managers, peers, and direct reports (Manning, 2013; Tee & Ahmed, 2014). Normally, 
between eight and 12 people fill out an anonymous online feedback form with questions covering a 
comprehensive range of workplace competencies (Manning, 2013). Responses are rated on a scale 
from 1 (very satisfied) to 5 (very dissatisfied), with a provision for written comments (Manning, 
2013). The subject of the feedback fills out a self-rating form with the same questions asked of 
managers, peers, and direct reports (Manning, 2013). Managers use 360-feedback data to obtain a 
better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of employees and other managers (Tepper et 
al., 2006). Using the 360-degree feedback program helps to identify deviant behaviors such as AS in 
individuals (Tee & Ahmed, 2014). 
Conduct Background Checks 
As part of due diligence, IVCs often request a list of references to contact and learn more about 
management’s background and confirm whether the team might be financially backed (Brisbourne, 
2011). As part of this background examination, IVCs could find occurrences of AS. Through the 
management due-diligence process, IVCs develop an understanding of the primary gaps in the 
management team. For AS, IVCs could review (a) the founders and their backgrounds (what is true, 
what is not true); (b) disclosures of mental health issues; (c) disclosures of past and current employee 
complaints; (d) employee confidentiality agreements; (e) past and current performance evaluations; 
(f) experience commensurate with position; (g) investigative reports on all principals, managers, and 
directors for instances of AS; (h) credit history reports on all principals, managers, and directors 
(specifically looking for lawsuits placement on government registries and abnormal transactions 
related to deviant behaviors); and (i) resume/curriculum vitae verification on all principals, 
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Assess the Management Team for AS 
IVCs need to ask and receive satisfactory responses as to whether (a) managers exhibit a capacity for 
sustained effort (DeCleyn & Braet, 2007); (b) the management team is flexible or rigid in its 
orientation (MaRS, 2013); (c) management skills and personalities exhibit any signs of AS (MaRS, 
2013); (d) the number of employees, turnover, absentee problems, and hiring projections indicate AS 
is present (MaRS, 2013); (e) any manager is seen as an outlier (DeCleyn & Braet, 2007); (f) 
personality conflicts and or mismatches exist within the management team (MaRS, 2013); (g) critical 
resources managers have access to bank accounts (MaRS, 2013); and (h) managers evaluate risk well 
(DeCleyn & Braet, 2007). 
IVCs could use Tepper’s (2000) 15-item scale to assess for AS. Tepper’s scale consists of items 
prefaced with the statement, “My boss…” Respondents use the following 5-point response scale: 1 (I 
cannot remember him/her ever using this behavior with me), 2 (He/she very seldom uses this 
behavior with me), 3 (He/she occasionally uses this behavior with me), 4 (He/she uses this behavior 
moderately often with me), and 5 (He/she uses this behavior very often with me; Tepper, 2000, p. 189). 
The items were as follow: (1) ridicules me, (2) tells me my thoughts or feelings are stupid, (3) gives 
me the silent treatment, (4) puts me down in front of others, (5) invades my privacy, (6) reminds me 
of my past mistakes and failures, (7) doesn’t give me credit for jobs requiring a lot of effort, (8) names 
me to save himself/herself embarrassment, (9) breaks promises he/she makes, (10) expresses anger 
at me when he/she is mad for another reason, (11) makes negative comments about me to others, 
(12) is rude to me, (13) does not allow me to interact with my coworkers, (14) tells me I’m 
incompetent, and (15) lies to me (Tepper, 2000, pp.189–190). 
Observe the Management Team in Action 
IVCs must observe how managers interact with employees when conducting due diligence on the 
management team. IVCs might notice whether a manager is demeaning (Bowling & Michel, 2011). 
The IVC need to notice if a manager is verbally disrespectful, belittles, or humiliates an employee 
(Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002). The IVC could notice if a manager is controlling and isolates 
employees (Michel, Newness, & Duniewicz, 2016). IVCs might review policies and procedures to 
ensure conformance to standards (Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2015). The IVC could notice if the 
manager appears to lack confidence in employees by closely reviewing every detail of an employees 
work such as wanting to see each e-mail sent and why and when the employee left his or her desk 
(Tepper et al., 2011). The IVC could see if managers attempt to isolate employees from others (Duffy 
et al., 2002). IVCs could observe whether managers trust employees by noticing the manager closely 
watching what an employee does (Michel et al., 2016). IVCs need to notice if the manager speaks 
unfavorably about an employee or former employees especially in front of coworkers (Bowling & 
Michel, 2011).  The IVC needs to speak with and interview a representative sample of employees to 
decide if a manager exhibits AS (Nunes et al., 2011). 
Study Limitations 
The primary limitation of this study was scant extant research exists identifying IVCs being able to 
detect AS during due-diligence process of the management team. This limitation was ameliorated by 
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IVCs and AS but not specifically IVCs being able to detect AS during due-diligence process of the 
management team. The second limitation was in not using primary data collection methods used 
such as interviews, surveys, and questionnaires. IVCs being able to detect AS during due-diligence 
process of the management team is unexplored and underexplored therefore the likelihood IVCs 
would be able to sufficiently address the research question was deemed nil. The third limitation was 
that the selection of the main research databases related to the topic. I am unable to guarantee all 
AS, IVC, due-diligence articles in the extant were selected for review. The fourth limitation was that 
I did not in applying the systematic literature method perform forward searches due to temporal and 
resources constraints. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Finding AS among management is difficult because AS is a subjective assessment based on an 
employee’s perceptions and within the context of the work environment (Tepper, 2000). Because of 
the high cost associated with AS, IVCs and senior management at portfolio firms need to be educated 
on the potential impacts of AS on staff to mitigate the effects of abuse and associated costs. In this 
exploratory research, I provided information to bring awareness of AS to IVCs and offered tools, 
processes, and methods IVCs can use to detect AS when conducting due diligence on the 
management team. I answered the following research question: What tools, processes, and methods 
can IVCs use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the management team leading to 
successful exits? My findings indicated IVCs need to (a) implement a 360-degree feedback program, 
(b) conduct detailed background checks on the management team, (c) assess the management team 
for AS, and (d) observe the management in action. 
IVCs might become cognizant of AS. Otherwise, the portfolio company might experience (a) lower 
employee retention rates, (b) higher employee turnover, (c) lower morale, (d) lower job satisfaction, 
(e) diminishing trust of managers, which can create (f) conflict between work and family obligations, 
(g) lessened commitment to the organization affecting organizational success, and (h) higher risk of 
an unsuccessful exit. Managers could establish healthy working relationships to help ensure 
competitive advantage of the company.  
Regarding future research, I recommend follow-up research as to the specific instances related to 
awareness of AS among IIVCs. Quantitative research should be considered for examining whether a 
relationship exists between AS and management review and/or performance during due diligence. 
Researchers should consider qualitative research by conducted interviews of IVCs to understand 
whether IVCs are open to or use the findings from this study when conducting due diligence of the 
management team. 
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